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International donors, NGOs, and the geopolitics of youth citizenship in contemporary 
Lebanon   
 
Introduction 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 20011, ushered in a period of intense, if not 
unprecedented, intervention by the United States and other Western powers in the Middle 
East.  This intervention began with massive military invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan but soon 
included ‘softer’—and what some foreign-policy practitioners called ‘smarter’—forms of 
involvement designed to foster wholesale societal transformation in the Arab/Muslim world.2  
A key component of the ‘smart power’ strategies pursued over the past decade has been the 
funding of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to the promotion of 
democracy.  Support for democracy promotion by the U.S. government, as well as by other 
Western3 governments and philanthropic organizations, has been based on the assumption 
that the region’s instabilities stem from a democratic deficit and a deep attraction to 
authoritarianism within Arab and Muslim culture.  What is needed to create security in the 
region, from this perspective, is a profound shift in values and socio-political norms among the 
region’s people.   
 
Critical-geopolitics scholarship has been highly skeptical of the aims and suppositions 
underlying democracy-promotion activities, as well as the effectiveness of these activities in 
addressing the region’s conflicts.  Bali and Rana4, for instance, describe democracy promotion 
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as part of a long-running project among U.S. policymakers to exercise strategic power in the 
Middle East and to maintain a geopolitical political order favorable to its own interests.  As an 
alternative to realpolitik, Bali and Rana explain, the commitment to democracy conforms to 
America’s conceptualization of itself ‘as a chosen community, enjoying a historically redemptive 
mission’.5  Yet the supposed aims of democracy promotion—to bring freedom and peace to the 
region’s inhabitants—sits uneasily with America’s continued support of autocratic regimes, 
whom U.S. policymakers cast as forces of ‘moderation’ despite their obvious repressiveness.   
 
This article is situated in these critical assessments of Western, and especially American, 
intervention in the Arab World and the broader Middle East.  Yet it also attempts to reach 
beyond the broad critiques of Western foreign policy and the ‘War on Terror’ that have been 
the hallmark of critical-geopolitics literature on the Middle East since 9/11.6  Here, we take a 
step toward examining the ways that Western geopolitical agendas actually take shape in local 
contexts by offering a qualitative analysis of NGOs in Lebanon.  This analysis interrogates the 
kinds of democratic citizenship that NGOs are attempting to create and explores how NGOs 
critically engage with and/or resist Western democracy-promotion strategies.   
 
Our focus on NGO activities, and our concern with the kinds of outcomes NGO activities might 
produce in local contexts, reflects and draws upon feminist approaches to critical geopolitics.  
One strand of feminist geopolitics has been to explore the ways in which geopolitical discourse 
translates into everyday political practices in places that are subject to foreign-policy 
intervention.  Toward this end, feminist scholars have sought to shift the focus of enquiry from 
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foreign-policy discourse and the ‘disembodied practices of statecraft’ to the sites and subjects 
of domination, linking the ‘discursive realm of representation to the lived realities of individuals 
and communities’.7  Following these insights, we examine the localized contexts in which real, 
identifiable people put into play, but also contest, the geopolitical visions of powerful state 
actors.  In doing so, we highlight the ways in which a wide variety of actors, including voluntary 
organizations, are the means by which geopolitical relationships unfold in the course of 
everyday life.    
 
Our discussion draws on fieldwork conducted in Lebanon, a country whose instability—typically 
attributed to its complex confessional composition—has on many occasions invited the 
intervention of foreign powers.  Western interest in Lebanon has increased in recent years with 
the deepening of a regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  Eager to see pro-Western 
interests hold sway in Lebanon and to dampen the power of militant pro-Iranian groups like 
Hizbullah, the U.S., Britain, the European Union, and others have poured hundreds of millions 
of dollars of aid into the country.  International agencies and Western donor states work 
through local NGOs to implement the dual goals of democratization through civil society and 
free-market economic development. 8   Youth-oriented initiatives, in particular, serve to 
assemble and to normalize certain citizenship ideals that are seen as crucial to achieving 
democracy and development, including ‘active citizenship’, global consciousness, tolerance of 
diversity, and acceptance of individual responsibility.9  By submerging sectarian-based political 
differences amongst Lebanese youth, NGOs and their funders attempt to create a unified, 
stable nation and a reliable ‘partner’ in the Middle East.   
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While focusing on the key role of Western-funded NGOs in shaping political life in the Middle 
East, our analysis suggests that Western governments are limited in their ability to achieve 
particular ends in the region through civil society.  NGOs, we emphasize, operate in a complex, 
pluralistic political environment marked by multiple sources of political legitimacy, authority, 
and sovereignty10.  Confronted by local political realities, local NGO directors routinely question 
the efficacy of their work and seek ways to circumvent the conditions placed on them by 
Western funders.  Their own critical assessment of Western-funded civil society, we suggest, 
calls into question the extent to which democracy promotion can secure Western geopolitical 
interests, much less enforce Western political supremacy. 
 
Democracy, civil society and the politics of NGO activity  
 
The funding of democracy promotion activities by Western aid agencies and donors in the 
Arab/Muslim world must be situated in much broader patterns of NGO development 
worldwide.   The rapid proliferation of NGOs and the increasingly prominent role of NGOs in 
governance, especially in ‘post-conflict’, ‘divided’ or ‘transitional’ societies, began to capture 
the attention of scholars in the early 1990s in the wake of dramatic political transformations in 
Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and South Africa, amongst other contexts.  For some scholars, the 
proliferation of NGO activity has been indicative of the empowerment of non-state actors 
under conditions of globalization.  McGann and Johnstone11, pointing to the role of NGOs in 
shepherding the post-socialist political transformation of Eastern Europe and to the influence of 
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NGO activists at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, describe NGOs as challenging 
traditional political institutions and power-brokers, as providing an alternative to ‘bloated’ and 
‘unresponsive’ bureaucracies, and as addressing vital global issues that cannot be addressed 
adequately by nation-states.  NGOs, some also suggest, have brought an element of democratic 
participation to what had been top-down development practices in the Global South. While 
these authors have expressed concerned about the ‘crisis’ of NGO ‘accountability’ in the 
societies in which they operate, they suggest that overall, NGOs have had a profound and 
largely positive role in re-shaping world politics.   
 
At the same time, however, a large body literature has taken a more skeptical view of NGOs 
and the roles they have come to occupy in impoverished and politically unstable countries.  
Criticisms of NGOs are wide ranging and often touch on the insensitivity and obliviousness of 
Western aid workers and consultants, who often ‘parachute’ into difficult situations for short-
term assignments in order to boost their résumés, and on the tremendous social, economic, 
and political dislocations caused by the intrusion of foreign aid organizations in poor countries.  
Far from grassroots forms of empowerment, NGOs, from this perspective, serve as instruments 
of foreign donors, who, for the most part, are committed to neoliberal ideology and who 
remain wedded to neo-colonial assumptions of Western superiority. 12   
 
In recent years, these critical accounts have given more particular attention to the workings of 
the so-called ‘democracy industry’, which has been instrumental in disseminating a relatively 
standardized set of democratic ‘best practices’ as a means of fostering societal reconciliation 
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and long-term stability in post-conflict settings worldwide.13   The democracy industry, which 
includes private- and state-funded foundations and myriad independent consultants and 
democracy professionals, implements particular understandings of democratic citizenship and 
civil society that, critics charge, serve the economic and geopolitical interests of donor states 
and organizations more than those of local communities.14  The following discussion elaborates 
on these arguments, examining the particular ways that Western donors and NGOs articulate 
and implement democracy and citizenship. 
 
Democracy Promotion and the Formulation of Citizenship in Post-Conflict Societies 
 
For those promoting democracy in unstable, divided settings, civil society is the key to 
addressing social fragmentation, building a functioning demos, ensuring state responsiveness to 
citizens’ needs, and boosting state legitimacy; for this reason, funders of democracy initiatives 
prioritize the ‘improvement’ and ‘strengthening’ of civil society and the formation of norms and 
attitudes that are conducive to participation in civil society.15  At a practical level, however, 
Western donors tend to construe civil society in rather limited terms, privileging local NGOs as 
agents of desired political transformation.16  Indeed, to a considerable degree, the presence of 
NGOs has become the key indicator of the development of democracy in transitional 
societies,17 with organizations such as the Open Society Institute and Civitas explicitly framing 
democratization in terms of the development of NGOs.  To foster NGO-based civil society, 
funders train local professionals who become well versed in the language and terminology of 
‘active citizenship’ and democratic participation.  In countries like Lebanon, it is common for 
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these local professionals also to have lived and perhaps to have been educated in the West.  
Such professionals may be particularly well equipped to meet the requirements of external 
funders and donors—a crucial advantage in a highly competitive funding environment.   
 
Alex Jeffrey18 describes the process of developing, institutionalizing, and professionalizing local 
NGOs within a framework created by donors as the ‘gentrification of civil society’.  Current 
scholarship identifies a number of tensions relating to state legitimacy and democratization 
that are produced by gentrified civil society.  Perhaps most importantly, the gentrification of 
civil society promotes the conflation of a particular form of governance (i.e. governance 
through community) with the development and functioning of an autonomous public sphere.  
The term ‘NGO’, in this regard, is somewhat deceptive, suggesting, as it does, independence 
from governments and governance.  A great deal of NGO activity, in fact, is directed by state 
and quasi-state agencies and/or is encouraged as a substitute for state provision of services 
within a neoliberal policy context.19  This involvement of NGOs in governance can be expedient 
insofar as services can be delivered efficiently and disentangled from existing patronage 
networks.   But critics argue that the folding of NGOs into systems of governance tends both to 
compromise state legitimacy and to prevent NGOs from expressing political dissent, which is 
the very purpose the civil society is intended to support.20    
 
Promoting ‘universal’ values, moreover, often means dampening, or excluding, those practices 
and political identities that might threaten coexistence and consensus.  Likewise, fostering civil, 
non-violent dialogue can mean glossing-over contentious historical narratives and memories, as 
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practitioners and donors are wary of rekindling conflict.  These tendencies are especially 
evident in programs that focus on children and youth.  Such programs – delivered through 
school curricula, organized youth activities, and ‘leadership seminars’ –seek to replace divisive 
communal identities with notions of citizenship that revolve around individual responsibility, 
empowerment, and community service.21  These citizenship discourses might make sense in a 
post-conflict society where group antagonisms have abated but not completely disappeared.   
Yet by submerging conflicting values, practices, and perspectives, NGOs risk creating a civil 
society that, while perhaps ‘civil’, is depoliticized and detached from the messiness of everyday 
political life.22   
 
In sum, the promotion of democracy through NGOs is a fraught process, and critics have 
indicated a number of tensions that emerge from NGOs’ efforts to transform political life in 
transitional settings:  while attempting to reconcile antagonistic groups and to build consensus, 
NGOs may sideline certain voices and restrict political life; while seeking to build state 
legitimacy, NGOs may undermine that legitimacy by assuming governing functions; and while 
promoting active citizen participation and empowerment, they may discourage the dissent that 
might lead to more substantive political changes.  These criticisms speak, on the one hand, to 
the influence that NGOs exercise in shaping political relationships and structures of governance 
in transitional societies.  But on the other hand, they indicate some significant limitations that 
NGOs—and hence, donor agencies—may face in effecting political transformation.  For 
instance, by pushing aside very real political differences and identities in the quest to foster 
tolerance and consensus, NGOs may render themselves incapable of dealing with these 
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differences in a way that is meaningful to people. 23  Some scholars have noted the particular 
skepticism among young people toward NGO democratization discourses, which bear little 
relation to their daily experiences and observations of social differences and inequalities.24  
More broadly, local NGOs, by aligning themselves with donor aims and orientations, may limit 
their own relevance and legitimacy, especially if donors demand that NGOs not associate with 
particular groups.25  Bars on serving people affiliated with certain political organizations does 
not delegitimize these organizations or make them any less relevant in terms of the provision of 
security, representation, and patronage.  Local NGOs may struggle for credibility if they are 
unable to engage with such groups, making donor aims difficult or impossible to implement.  Of 
course, NGOs can circumvent donor restrictions by engaging with ostracized groups, but this, 
again, will undermine rather than support the geopolitical agendas of donor states.  In short, 
and perhaps unsurprisingly, the political circumstances generated by NGO activities are far 
more complicated and ambiguous than smart-power advocates have recognized, and we must 
question the notion that Western aid agencies are straightforwardly directing political 
outcomes in the places where they operate.26   
 
NGO activity in the Arab World and Lebanon 
 
These critical discussions of NGO activities in transitional societies have particular relevance to 
contexts in the Middle East.  As described earlier, the promotion of democracy through NGOs 
became an important component of Western foreign policy in the Middle East following the 
9/11 attacks, though we can trace current democratization strategies to the end of the Cold 
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War, when Western states seized upon civil society as a means of fostering pro-Western 
political orientations in the region.  At that time, Western states and institutions—particularly 
in the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, and Canada—began to seek partnerships with pro-
democracy organizations in the Arab world while continuing to support authoritarian regimes 
that aligned themselves with Western interests in return for military hardware and 
development assistance.  Most activity in the 1990s was carried out by large, publicly funded 
institutions like the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the International Democratic 
Institute (IDI) (both created by the U.S. Congress during the Reagan Administration to promote 
democracy and free enterprise in the post-colonial world), the German stiftungen (party-
affiliated foundations), the UK-based Westminster Foundation for Democracy, and Canada’s 
International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development.  The stated aims of most 
of these ‘democracy brokers’, as Carapico27 calls them, was to promote electoral and judicial 
reform, civil society, democratic participation, and economic liberalization.  Funders typically 
would identify local partners to implement programs, which usually involved training 
workshops, conferences, and seminars on democratic procedure and/or research and 
documentation on elections and human rights.   Western-backed Arab rulers, for their part, 
alternately sought to co-opt NGOs and to control and curtail their activities. 
 
 These activities assumed greater urgency in the Middle East after 9/11.  For the U.S. national 
security establishment, in particular, the 9/11 attacks represented an existential struggle 
between radical Islam and Western freedoms and democracy.  In the wake of the attacks, the 
Bush Administration redoubled America’s drive to promote democracy, positing that the active 
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support of democratic reform in Arab countries would turn the tide against Islamic extremism 
and terrorism and secure U.S. energy interests, as well as Israel’s security.28  The Obama 
Administration has reiterated the U.S. commitment to financial support for organizations in the 
Arab world that promote democracy, human rights, civic engagement, and free elections, 
though advocates of smart power have heavily criticized Obama for what they view as half-
hearted support for pro-democracy movements in the region since the Arab Spring uprisings in 
2011.  These critics have been dismayed by the reduction in assistance to the region and the 
Administration’s seeming shift toward narrower ‘security’ goals after more than a decade of 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.29  Still, the NDI and IRI continue to have an active 
presence in the Arab world, along with the National Institute of Peace, an organization created 
by Congress to promote ‘conflict management’ in volatile regions, and the Middle East Partner 
Initiative (MEPI), an agency created by the State Department in 2002 to support activities 
relating to democratic participation, electoral reform, and civil society.  Important U.S.-based 
private foundations working on democracy in the Arab world include the Open Society 
Foundations, the Ford Foundation, and AMIDEAST, an independent non-profit organization 
focused on educational exchanges between the U.S. and Arab countries.  European and 
Canadian quasi-government institutions have also ramped up their presence in the Arab world 
and have been joined by a variety of independent foundations such as former British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s Faith Foundation, which has recently called for greater involvement in the 
Middle East to counter the supposedly destabilizing influence of radicalized Islam.30 
 
NGO activity, and sectarianism in Lebanon 
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Over the past decade, these and many other agencies and foundations have increased their 
profile in Lebanon, a country with a long history of Western institutional involvement, 
especially through Catholic and Protestant missionaries.  In dedicating resources to civil society 
in Lebanon, many donors have been explicit about their desire to address what they view as the 
country’s troublesome sectarian political structure—a structure which Western powers 
themselves helped to fashion starting in the 19th century.31  This political structure, which 
divides key political posts and electoral seats by sect, was agreed upon by Lebanon’s elites in 
the 1940s as a means of sharing power between the country’s Christians, Sunni Muslims, and 
Shi’a Muslims.   As Weiss32 notes, Lebanese commentators have alternately defended the 
sectarian system as solution to the problem of multi-confessional coexistence and denounced it 
as a tool of foreign intervention and domination.  Following the Lebanese Civil War (1975-
1990), which was partly fought along sectarian lines, political leaders expressed their 
commitment to a non-sectarian political system as the only means of achieving lasting peace; 
but the peace agreement forged after the war largely maintained the pre-civil war political 
order, albeit with a shift in the balance of power from Christians to Muslims.  Nonetheless, 
politicians take every opportunity, however disingenuously, to display their commitment to a 
multi-sectarian coexistence and to accuse their political opponents of fomenting sectarian 
discord.33  
 
Western donors and international agencies have inserted themselves into this shifting, and 
often confounding, political landscape.  Western expenditures increased significantly after 
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2005, with the emergence of a viable anti-Syrian, anti-Iranian, pro-Saudi, Sunni-led faction 
under the leadership of Saad Hariri.34   The flow of Western aid has been aimed at countering 
the influence of Hizbullah, a militant Shi’a organization with ties to Iran and Syria that is 
currently supporting the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war.    As Fregonese35 notes, Western 
states, and especially the United States, have consistently portrayed Hizbullah as a menacing 
state-within-a-state, a terrorist organization, and as a major cause of regional instability.36   
 
Since 2011, aid flows from the West have increased significantly due to fears of political 
instability linked to the Syrian civil war, even as financial commitments to the region overall 
appear to be under threat from budget cuts and shifting priorities.37  A large portion of Western 
aid continues to be directed at the Lebanese military, infrastructure projects, and direct 
government assistance.  Millions of dollars, pounds, and Euros, though, have been dedicated to 
bolstering Lebanese civil society, which has mushroomed in size and scope in the past decade.38    
It is difficult to provide an exact count of Western donor-supported NGOs in the country, as 
many organizations are ephemeral due to their dependence on grant income.  But our research 
has identified more than 400 functioning NGOs in Lebanon today, many of which receive some 
measure of Western donor support or are run directly by Western philanthropic organizations 
(e.g. Save the Children, World Vision).  
 
In their promotion of civil society in Lebanon, Western donors view themselves as central to 
Lebanon’s political redemption by fostering a robust, non-sectarian political system and by 
instilling the Lebanese people with liberal-democratic values.  As fluctuating as the NGO sector 
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may be, donors see it as helping to create a stable and reliable ‘partner’ in the Middle East that 
can resist the influence of Iran and Syria, as well as of radical Islam.  As we discuss below, 
however, Western-funded NGOs compete with other, sectarian-based networks of civil-society 
organizations—most notably those affiliated with Hizbullah—for influence and legitimacy.  So 
while the sector has a ubiquitous presence in Lebanon, its influence on Lebanese society and 
Lebanese politics must be interrogated rather than assumed. 
 
The following sections describe the workings of Western-funded NGOs in greater detail, giving 
particular attention to the ways that NGOs, following donor prerogatives, implement 
citizenship discourses that emphasize consensus, ‘common ground’, and incremental change in 
localities.  But we also examine the limitations NGOs face in transforming existing political 
structures, in part due to the skepticism that NGO directors feel toward donor organizations.  
NGOs in many ways operate against the grain of Lebanese sectarianism, but they are, at the 
same time, entangled in the sectarian political system and are forced to compete with others 
for patronage and legitimacy.  This account highlights the lack of alignment between donor 
aims and on-the-ground political realities in Lebanon (and elsewhere) and questions the ability 
of Western funders to direct civil society according to their own geopolitical interests.  To 
begin, we provide a brief description of our research. 
 
Sources and data collection 
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The following discussion draws on information gathered in Lebanon over a 10-month period 
from September 2010 to June 2011, followed by a second wave of fieldwork from May 2013 to 
April 2014.  This research has been part of an on-going, multi-country project on youth 
citizenship in divided and post-conflict societies.39  Here, we draw on semi-structured 
interviews conducted with employees of 41 NGOs, most of them headquartered in Beirut.   
These NGOs are among the scores of voluntary, civic, and philanthropic organizations that 
operate in Lebanon and that receive varying levels of foreign-donor support.  The groups we 
interviewed were focused on a variety of issues— the environment, human rights, 
entrepreneurship, civic engagement, education, women’s empowerment, social media and IT 
training—but all had some youth-based component, such as a summer camp, a youth 
leadership training program, or a conflict resolution workshop.  Each group we interviewed 
received at least some funding from a foreign government or quasi-governmental foundation 
(USAID, MEPI, NED, Anna Lindh Foundation), from international organizations (e.g. the UN or 
the EU), individual Western embassies (especially Canadian, American, Norwegian, and Italian), 
and/or independent Western-based NGOs and foundations.  Most had received funds from 
several sources.    
 
We spoke formally with about 48 individuals, though we typically spoke informally to several 
other people within each organization.  During the interviews, we asked study participants to 
discuss their programming and to explain the importance of youth-based work; we also asked 
them to tell us about their relationships with funders and their responses to funder directives 
and priorities.  Finally, we asked them to explain their vision for the kind of citizenship and the 
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relationships between individuals and the state that they hoped to foster through their 
activities.   Most of our Lebanese interviewees were fluent in English, reflecting the widespread 
bilingualism (and tri-lingualism) among the middle classes in Lebanon.  In a few instances 
(mainly when dealing with francophone Lebanese), we needed the help of translators, whom 
we found among the employees of the organization. 
 
In addition to interviews with NGOs in Lebanon, we conducted interviews with a former attaché 
in the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and sixteen representatives of international organizations based in 
Lebanon, Europe, or the U.S.  We asked for information about the workings of their agencies 
and their programmatic goals and priorities; we also asked them to comment on whether and 
how they attempt to instill democratic values in the Arab world, and what they understand to 
be the aims of civil society, particularly with respect to youth. Finally, we spoke two Lebanese 
MPs and with seven educational professionals familiar with citizenship and civic education in 
Lebanon.  These individuals provided us with general information about the ways that different 
political actors have focused on youth programs both to preserve and to eliminate sectarian 
differences.  This information was supplemented by secondary information, including 
newspaper accounts, organizational reports, and websites. 
  
As we have indicated above, the Western-funded NGO sector in Lebanon is quite large and 
constantly in flux, with organizations forming and dissolving with shifts in funding streams and 
programs.  The 41 NGOs included in our study should not be regarded as a representative 
sample of the entire NGO sector, much less of the entire spectrum of civil society in Lebanon.  
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However, these NGOs do encompass a wide range of organizations in terms of aims, activities, 
and funding sources, and our interviews provide some indication of the real-world contexts in 
which donor aims are implemented.  In offering a qualitative analysis of NGO activities and the 
dilemmas NGO directors face in responding to donor priorities, our objective is to illustrate 
some of the ways that the geopolitical aims of donors intersect with, and at times come up 
against, local political realities.   There are undoubtedly many other stories to be told about civil 
society, foreign aid, and geopolitical conflict in Lebanon.    
 
  Respondents were promised confidentiality for themselves.   To protect the anonymity of 
study participants, we do not refer to any individuals by name, and we have removed, to the 
best of our ability, information that might identify their organizational connections.  
 
 
NGOs and the production of youth citizenship in Lebanon  
 
As described above, youth-based programs have emerged as a key priority of Western donors, 
and most major quasi-public and private philanthropic organizations have some focus on youth.  
For instance, MEPI lists ‘Inspiring Youth’ as one of its major aims (along with ‘Empowering 
Women’, ‘Supporting Democracy Builders’, and ‘Fostering Economic Opportunity’), describing 
youth as ‘the strongest advocates for positive change in their societies’.40   In Lebanon, MEPI 
has recently partnered with local organizations on youth entrepreneurship projects and on film 
and social-media projects designed to promote political reform, and it has regularly brought 
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‘civically-minded’ students from Lebanon and other Arab countries to the United States for 
leadership and citizenship training.  Similarly, the Anna Lindh Foundation—a European 
intergovernmental institution that operates in the Mediterranean region and that currently 
partners with over 80 Lebanese NGOs and cultural/educational institutions—lists as one of its 
priorities the provision of educational programs for youth to promote ‘intercultural dialogue’ 
and citizenship.   The Foundation has produced a ‘citizenship handbook’ for young Arabs to 
acquire the ‘knowledge and skills to play an active role in civic life at the local and international 
level’, and it has supported debate training across the region to encourage young people to 
‘speak up and be heard’.   It also has provided guidance for school textbook writers in the 
region to ‘construct a shared narrative for history education’.41  Tony Blair’s Faith Foundation 
has also been involved in school-based curriculum development for the purpose of promoting 
intercultural dialogue.  His foundation’s ‘Face Faith’ program, which operates in Lebanon and 
18 other countries, uses telecommunications technology to link together students from 
different religious backgrounds worldwide in order to ‘gain the dialogue skills required to 
prevent conflict’ and to combat extremism by ‘breaking down religious and cultural 
stereotypes’.  
 
The local NGO workers in Lebanon whom we interviewed generally share the assumption that 
that young people are the most receptive to efforts to transform attitudes and social-political 
behaviors in post-conflict societies.42  There was, in this sense, a very clear correspondence 
between donor aims and funding priorities and local NGO orientations.  One NGO leader with 
whom we spoke stated that while often socialized into sectarianism at a very young age, young 
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people are relatively uncorrupted by Lebanese politics and therefore more open to democratic 
practices and norms.  Mohammed, a scouting organization leader, states, ‘…[I]n Lebanon, 
where everyone is so busy with power, money, and authority, you have to start with youth.  
They are the future of this country, and I think this is the only possible way to make a difference 
in a hundred years.’  Similarly, Roula states, ‘I think that most people are very tired of the 
system, but above a certain age, they won’t do anything.  They’ll just go along.  The youth are 
the ones that want to change things’.  A variation on this theme comes from Bassem, who 
describes young people as part of the ‘text generation’—pragmatic, savvy in social networking, 
well-traveled, and familiar with Western culture.  They are, he argues, at an ‘age of purity and 
pragmatism’ and ‘unpolluted by the political system’.  
 
The NGO-led youth programming that we encountered in our research reflects the 
preoccupations of Western civic education theorists, including the need to foster civic 
knowledge, civic engagement, leadership, tolerance, and, increasingly, global awareness.43 Our 
interviewees’ fluency in citizenship pedagogy comes from attending American educational 
institutions in the Arab world, studying abroad, attending conferences, and/or going through 
NGO-based training programs.  For instance, Bassem, who runs a university-based civic 
engagement program, had spent time studying at a U.S. university, where he learned about 
service learning and civic-engagement curriculum requirements.  He then partnered with a U.S. 
university to form a mock international parliament in Lebanon, and parlayed this into a civic 
engagement program.  Hiba, who has been involved in non-sectarian scouting, in addition to 
working toward a degree in education at an English-speaking university, was recruited to 
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participate in a civic engagement program in London; when we spoke with her, she was 
preparing to go the U.S. for a 4-week long program on leadership and citizenship.  After 
graduating from university, she then was employed by another NGO that offered programming 
for youth.  This sort of ‘career path’ is not unusual, as NGOs are part of handful of few sectors 
that are growing44.   A final example is Mohammed, a youth leadership consultant who works 
extensively with USAID and international NGOs.  Mohammad holds a master’s degree in 
education from an English-language university and has participated for years in international 
scouting leadership training programs; most of his material comes from UNICEF or from U.S. 
and European sources, which he accesses over the internet.   
 
The specific terminology used by our interviewees was consistent and centered on the 
production of active citizens who act responsibility in their communities and who build bridges 
between sectarian communities.  Key terms that appear in the interviews include capacity 
building, conflict resolution/management, coexistence, mutual respect, and dialogue—all of 
which are set in contrast to the divisive and corrupt sectarian politics currently existing in 
Lebanon.  Our respondents explicitly describe these activities as ‘non-political’ or as 
‘depoliticizing’, in the sense that they encourage young people to transcend sectarian 
differences and sectarian prejudices.  Toward this end, many activities funded by Western 
agencies and NGOs attempt to bring together young people from different sectarian 
backgrounds and meet and interact in controlled settings, with the assumption that greater 
contact between groups will diminish stereotypes and hostilities.  Bechara, who started 
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summer camps for young people during the civil war, and who continues to be involved in 
youth camps and conflict intervention, expresses this view as follows: 
 
When we live in a ghetto area, you build fear.  You cannot do anything: you 
cannot move, live, make a nation, make a future or a common project through 
fear.  Things are much easier when you know the other.  One objective is to take 
people from all regions—from Akkar, the South, Beqa’a, Mt. Lebanon, Beirut—
and mix them.  Everyone has to know each other, and the walls of prejudice will 
come down. 
 
This sentiment was expressed in virtually identical terms (e.g., ‘walls of prejudice’ and the 
importance of knowing one another) by an employee at the U.S. embassy and by a UN 
employee involved in youth citizenship programs.   
 
Many groups create activities that aim to train young people how to discuss controversial issues 
in a non-aggressive, non-confrontational manner and to reach consensus.  This is not to say that 
program coordinators discourage debate all together; but organizational leaders pick the topics 
to be discussed and exercise a significant degree of control over debate.  An example of this 
comes from a USAID-funded environmental organization that has initiated several youth-based 
programs centered on citizenship and environmental stewardship.  We quote one of the 
program directors at length to convey the emphasis on sublimating contentiousness and 
achieving consensus:  
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Political tensions were increasing in 2007-2008, so we started a program …to 
increase dialogue among young people through experiential learning.  We 
trained people to debate hot topics—electoral law, economic strategies, the role 
of women in society—things that have a lot of conflicting points of view.  We 
gathered young people from all regions …We tried to encourage a definition of 
dialogue that encourages them to think outside the box—to move away from 
debate and to move toward dialogue with the aim of finding a solution to a 
problem.  On the first day, they debate, but then they need to negotiate; they 
have to put something on the table that will be accepted by everyone …We don’t 
always reach consensus, but they at least can identify some points that unite 
them…. For people to be accepted into the program, they have to put aside their 
political point of view for a few days; they can talk policy, but not politics. 
 
 
The implication of such an approach is to construct debate as contentions where as dialogue 
can promote understanding, reconciliation and healing.  
 
The averseness to debate and the desire to cultivate dialogue, consensus, and common 
Lebanese identity among youth are understandable in the aftermath of a civil war marked by 
inter-sectarian violence.  And interviewees who experienced the civil war are justifiably wary of 
sectarian politicians and the raw pursuit of power.  Bechara, using the distinction in French 
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between le politique, which he defines as ‘community service’, and la politique, which he 
defines as ‘how to take power and to keep it,’ states,  
 
Our politicians don’t have time for us; they keep their power through fear and 
they put fear in front of their co-religionists.  La politique in Lebanon is also 
about clientelism—about buying votes.  Many political leaders in Lebanon have 
NGOs for the purpose of clientelism, for distributing favors and largesse, rather 
than for the purpose of serving. 
 
Echoing this view, Dina, who participates in an organization dedicated to youth 
entrepreneurialism and civic engagement and who also runs a university civic engagement 
program, decries the spread of sectarian politics to university campuses, and supports the 
decision of the university administration to clamp down on expressions of sectarianism on 
campus:    
 
These are students, they are not politicians, and this is a university. I mean, I 
think it shouldn’t be so politicized.  …This is a university and these are clubs and 
these are things that have to do with students.  It shouldn’t be political.  It’s a 
pity that everything should be turned politically in this country.  Let something 
be, just be, you know.  Let students just nominate themselves and get elected 
for their qualities, not because they belong to a party.   
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For Dina, politics and sectarianism are homologous, and there seems to be no possibility of 
non-sectarian politics.  Importantly, however, there was often a refusal to see the promotion of 
non-sectarianism (which is different from secularism) as political.  Debate, sectarianism and 
politics – in the minds of most of our respondents – led inevitably to heightened conflict, 
clientelism, and/or corruption.   
   
For respondents like Dina, the alternative to ‘politics’ is local action directed, for instance, 
toward municipal service-delivery.  The emphasis on local, incremental change, along with 
democratic virtues, is present in many of the interviews we conducted, and meshes with 
ideologies that encourage local communities to be responsible for their own well-being.45  For 
instance, Mohammed remarks, 
 
We have to start change at the local level, at the regional level, before thinking 
about changing this whole system, and I believe, brick after brick, we will be able 
to have more people who belief in each other, who believe in themselves, and 
who believe in developing a value system that starts from not littering from your 
car, from driving well, from appreciating the beauty of being alive in a certain 
place and space.   
 
Likewise, Dina states, 
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 All the things that we are doing, we’re not making this huge difference; maybe 
it’s just a tiny difference, but you have to look at it maybe ten years from now.  
Maybe now it’s really nothing compared to the big need, the big gap.   But it’s 
better than nothing, and then you are setting the environment for people to 
start getting more involved and maybe a couple of years down the road, things 
will look better.  
 
These, and many other youth leaders, excluded youth who were involved in political parties 
and sectarian activities from their organizations’ activities—or at least required them to remain 
silent about their party and sectarian affiliations.  While some leaders of NGOs did allow young 
people who were involved in parties to participate, they struggled to articulate or to imagine a 
form of politics that was not rooted in parties or sectarianism.   
 
The goal of much NGO activity is, then, to avoid politics and to replace still-salient political 
divisions with exercises in consensus-building and incremental change.  This goal is 
implemented through activities designed to activate youth citizenship at the local level—to give 
young people the sense that they are empowered within their local communities.  This 
requires, first and foremost, that young people learn to set aside sectarian identities and values 
and to think of themselves as citizens.   
 
 The limits to citizenship formation as a geopolitical practice 
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We have seen the NGO directors in Lebanon actively implement an internationalized, Western-
formulated liberal-democratic discourse through their activities.  Their explanations of their 
organizations’ aims and methods bear witness to the pervasiveness of the idea of (neo)liberal 
citizenship as a remedy for sectarian dysfunction.  This is not to say, however, that these 
discourses are simply and unproblematically translated into political change in Lebanon per the 
vision of the Western democracy industry or per the strategic aims of donor countries.  First, as 
much as NGOs seek to displace sectarianism and to re-formulate citizenship in Lebanon, they 
remain very much embedded in existing political structures and relationships.  Indeed, the fact 
that they receive funding from Western sources that openly support pro-Saudi factions while 
being openly hostile to Hizbulllah implicates NGOs in the very sectarian political structure they 
wish to dislodge.46 NGOs and their patrons, in this sense, should be counted among, and not 
apart from, the array of actors and institutions that exercise political power and sovereignty in 
Lebanon, including the numerous local foundations and philanthropic organizations that are 
affiliated with particular sectarian political parties or political figures.  Instructive cases are the 
Rene Mouwad Foundation, named for a Christian politician assassinated in 1989, and the Hariri 
Foundation, founded by former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri (father of Saad Hariri) during the 
civil war to provide scholarships.  While these organizations describe their philanthropic work 
as ‘non-sectarian’, they are widely understood to be components of extensive sectarian 
patronage networks that include mass media, scout troops, youth movements, housing 
developers, and even university faculties47.      
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NGO directors, of course, are fully aware of their own embroilment in Lebanese 
sectarian politics, and they are deeply ambivalent both about the role of Western 
funders and about their own role in Lebanese society.48  Some interviewees, for 
instance, remark upon the corruption endemic in the system of NGO sponsorship.  
Karim, who runs social media training workshops for young people, states: 
 
Many calls for proposals come up related to social media, so we get approached 
from various international organizations, that they want us to be with them on 
some proposal.   All the activity, everything, we’ll be doing; they will only be 
doing administrative stuff related to the project. They will give us 40% or 35% of 
the total project.  So, like, 65%, will go to the international organization just to 
support their international staff and their operation costs…And they will get 
millions of dollars to do this just because they know someone in some 
department that they did some project before. 
 
Other interviewees, while arguing for the need to bolster the state’s legitimacy by wresting the 
provision of social services away from sectarian parties, are uneasy with the takeover of the 
state by a civil society constituted almost entirely by NGOs.   Rashid, for instance, states, 
 
We don’t believe in the concept of state because we don’t have a state; we have 
political confessional leaders who have their inner state.  Having said that, the 
problem is that the state in Lebanon has been replaced by civil society.  Civil 
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society, due to the generosity of the West, managed to play the role of the state 
and forgot about its role as being a watchdog.   
 
Still others express frustration at the timidity of NGO politics and the emphasis on leadership 
skills, character development, and consensus over more substantive forms of participation and 
debate.  Hiba, for instance, states, ‘We help them be more of community helpers; more of 
having communication, leadership, social skills.  …They become better planners, organizers; 
they become better many things, but there’s no program for activating their citizenship and 
belonging to their country’.   
  
These concerns and frustrations speak to the ambivalence NGO directors feel, and the 
limitations they face, in attempting to create political alternatives in Lebanon.  They also point 
to the ways that NGO leaders at times circumvent or subvert Western geopolitical priorities.  
For instance, while some of our respondents have been willing to sign funding contracts with 
U.S. donors barring them from dealing with Hizbullah members, almost all of those with whom 
we spoke disparaged this policy of exclusion, arguing that Hizbullah is a legitimate actor in 
Lebanese politics and civil society. 49  Describing the time his pro-democracy group was 
approached by USAID to lead a peace dialogue project, Rashid states,  
 
They wanted us to sign a paper that Hizbullah is a terrorist organization…But I 
don’t believe that Hizbullah is a terrorist organization…If I’m going to rule out the 
  
  
29 
people who are supporting Hizbullah from the dialogue, who am I going to 
dialogue with?  
 
With the U.S. maintaining a hostile posture toward Hizbullah, the NGOs it supports have been 
largely closed off from Shi’a Lebanese communities, who constitute the largest segment of the 
Lebanese population.  One of our contacts at the U.S. Embassy admitted as much, noting that 
efforts by the embassy to engage Shi’a communities in language and American cultural 
programs had been more-or-less rejected by these communities.   For this very reason, some of 
the organizations with whom we spoke purposely did not solicit funds from U.S. agencies and 
turned instead to what they perceived to be more ‘neutral’ funders like the Norwegian 
embassy.  Sometimes, as well, they accept money from other agencies that receive U.S. funding 
if the intermediary does not impose the restrictions on Hizbullah.    
 
Equally subversive is the questioning of the wisdom and desirability of anti-sectarianism.    Ali, 
for instance, remarked on the small but vocal anti-sectarian political movement that organized 
a series of marches and demonstrations in Beirut in the Spring of 2011.  This movement was not 
funded or directed by Western funders, though it did enjoy the support of many NGOs, and it 
carried a familiar set of messages about liberal-democratic political reform.  Ali, while 
personally sympathizing with the movement, observes that those calling for an end of the 
sectarian system and the establishment of a secular state are themselves promoting a group-
specific position and one that does not speak to many ordinary Lebanese, who are deeply 
insecure about their economic and political position in the country.  He notes that secularism 
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and anti-sectarianism in the pre-civil war period was a position largely supported by Lebanon’s 
Orthodox Christian communities, and, in his opinion, continues to be associated with a limited 
segment of the population.   When asked if he sees current anti-sectarian leaders as different 
from the earlier generation, he remarks, 
 
I see the same people.  I see the people who are Hamra and Gemayze [two 
relatively cosmopolitan and affluent parts of the Beirut].  I don’t see that they 
are recruiting people in Chiyya [a poor Christian neighborhood that abuts a large 
Shi’a suburb].  Maybe they were honest in being secular, but they couldn’t move 
toward the other sects.  This is the same as Jumblatt.50  He wanted to be secular, 
but he couldn’t.  He couldn’t go out from his sect.  And I believe that those 
people are still carrying that.  There is individuality; there are also people who 
have lived outside Lebanon and they know what a secular system is. But what 
I’m saying is that the secular country is still far away from the people.  If they 
[anti-sectarian activists] want to do a demonstration, [they should] carry banners 
that answer the people’s needs, not ideologies.    
 
There is, then, some sentiment among our interviewees that sectarianism serves a purpose and 
is meaningful to people, and that it cannot and should not be attacked or dismantled.  In other 
words, despite their personal commitment to societal transformation in Lebanon, they do not 
seem entirely convinced about the feasibility or even desirability of the anti-sectarian politics 
that have been so central to Western donors’ investments in Lebanon. 
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Finally, we suggest that the ambivalence felt by NGO directors toward their own activities is 
also felt by the youth served by NGOs.  While we did not collect interviews with youth 
participants,51 we did find interesting anecdotal evidence of youth skepticism toward the 
democratization agenda, hinting at the inability for NGO directors (or donor agencies) to steer 
young people in a particular direction.52   An NGO report detailing the outcomes of a USAID-
funded program on youth citizenship is illustrative.  The report describes the recruitment of 
young people, mostly through universities and other NGOs, to take part in a 10-day leadership 
training program; these trainees then participated in a series of citizenship workshops with 
young people from all over Lebanon focused on ‘raising awareness of the values of citizen 
participation and dialogue, in order to bring people to question their sectarian attitudes’.  The 
report states that when participants were asked to define citizenship, they described the 
importance of recognizing a common history, common experiences, and a common future.  But 
the report also indicates that there was some significant discord among the participants, who 
apparently were not convinced by the message of consensus.  One participant, according to the 
report, ‘argued that we cannot have a common history because it depends on the way a certain 
group of people consider the history of certain events.’  This individual mentioned a notorious 
event in Lebanese history when the militia of Phalangist leader Samir Geagea massacred the 
family and entourage of his rival, Suleiman Frangieh.  The individual then suggested that ‘the 
reasons behind this assassination could be viewed differently according to people’s different 
political affiliations; either pro-government or opposition stances’. This set off an argument 
among the participants, divided between ‘people who agreed that the historical facts are the 
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same while the interpretation according to political affiliation is different, and those 
participants who did not feel comfortable with the idea of a shared history or shared anything 
else’.  The report deemed the event a great success in terms of training young people to think 
in terms of consensus, but the obvious contentiousness of this discussion suggests that political 
differences within Lebanese society are not easily subsumed by the depoliticizing activities of 
NGOs. 
 
In sum, international agents and donors play an important role in Lebanon and other post-
conflict societies through generous funding of NGOs.  But it is evident that these influences, on 
their own, may not be capable of fundamentally altering existing political systems, identities, 
and practices.  As both Fregonese and Hazbun53 have argued, the U.S. and other Western states 
have consistently failed to understand or to appreciate the multiply situated nature of political 
power, identity, and authority in Lebanon in the Middle East.  NGO directors negotiate this 
complex landscape on a daily basis and understand it well; while they adhere to the main 
tenets of Western liberal-democratic discourse, they are keenly aware of their limitations, and 
they question the value of their activities in actually fomenting meaningful change.  By the 
same token, they look for ways to be more effective by circumventing the restrictions placed on 
them by donors’ geopolitical agendas.   NGO directors’ questioning of, and resistance to, their 
circumstances suggests the difficulty in scripting a kind of civil society in post-conflict societies 
(and perhaps all societies) in which citizenship is defined in opposition to meaningful social 
identities.   Western donors, to be sure, have become important players in Lebanon’s political 
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system; yet their ability to direct geopolitical outcomes by transforming citizenship should not 
be taken at face value.  
 
Conclusion: Civil society, NGOs, and political futures in Lebanon 
 
This article has sought to broaden our perspective on Western geopolitical practice in the 
Middle East by considering the production of citizenship and civil society as a geopolitical 
strategy.  In doing so, it has brought the critical geopolitics literature, with its focus on foreign-
policy discourse, into conversation with the growing critical literature on foreign aid, NGOs, and 
civil society.  The U.S. and other Western states, we have shown, have tried to effect political 
change and to produce a favorable political order in the Middle East through the 
transformation of citizenship.  In the case of Lebanon, the transformation of citizenship has 
targeted the country’s sectarian political system, and donors have used local NGOs—most of 
whom have a sincere desire to encourage sensible political changes and to prevent further 
conflict—to press their own geopolitical agendas in the region.  NGO leaders, in turn, have 
become fluent in the language of citizenship and democratic citizenship proffered by 
international organizations and donors.  These discourses highlight the importance of civil 
society and youth as intended agents of wider democratic transformation.  While focused on 
the development of citizenship and democracy, NGO practices tend to promote the de-
politicization of youth by shifting political energies away from ‘sectarian politics’ and toward 
pragmatic problem-solving at the local scale.   
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In many ways, NGO activities serve the geopolitical needs of Western states, which are eager to 
stabilize what they view to be Lebanon’s dysfunctional sectarian system.  For the U.S. and other 
Western powers, Lebanon’s sectarianism leaves it vulnerable to outside meddling, especially by 
Iran and Syria.  The outcome of Western involvement, however, is neither the stabilization of 
Lebanon nor the demise of sectarianism.  Our interviewees, despite their commitment to a new 
political reality, are aware of the limitations they face and do not seem fully convinced of the 
effectiveness of their programs.   Reflecting their own experiences and values, they recognize 
sectarianism as meaningful and important to Lebanese citizens, if ultimately corrosive to the 
Lebanese state.  At the same time, they recognize Western donors, and especially the U.S., to 
be active participants in sectarian politics through their support of particular factions, rather 
than agents of change.  
  
The question that is raised, then, is what kind of citizenship and what of civil society will be 
created through the efforts of these, and other, organizations?  It is tempting but ultimately too 
simplistic to read the role of NGOs as the tools of Western or international interests.  The 
people who work in those organizations bring their own experiences and values to bear on their 
work and are deeply aware of the contradictions produced by their activities.  Even more, they 
bring to their work their own analyses of the conflicts that have divided Lebanon and that 
threaten its future—analyses that do not fully mesh with those of international donors.  While 
leaders of NGOs and international organizations may share values about the importance of 
working through civil society and the importance of building a new citizen identity for youth in 
Lebanon, they do not fully agree on the way forward or on the possibilities of non-sectarianism.  
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The promotion of youth citizenship by NGOs in Lebanon thus bears the imprint of Western 
geopolitical interests but is not reducible to those influences.  Far from depoliticized, citizenship 
in Lebanon remains deeply contested. 
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